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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
* , 
ANGEL JESUS HERNANDEZ, 
Defendant A ppellant. 
Case No. 200706984:: \ 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JUKISDIC I ION \ I \ DI il \ • I I J R EOF PR OCEEDINGS 
I 'his is an i jjL"om convictions for purchase, transfer, possession or use of a 
firearm by restricted person, a third degree felony, carrying a concealed dangerous weapon, 
n cla^s \ misdemeanor, and talse personal information f~ ? *v**re officer, i ,
 (.^ C 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
*
 T
 i the trial court, the State did not dispute defendant's claim that the officer's 
State argued that defendant's arrest was justified because there was objective probable cause 
to believe he had committed another offense: interference with an officer. The trial court 
denied defendant's motion to suppress without explanation. 
Is defendant entitled to reversal of his jury convictions where he attacks only the 
ground abandoned by the prosecutor and not the apparent basis for the trial court's ruling 
denying his motion to suppress? 
Since defendant does not challenge the apparent basis for the trial court's ruling 
denying his motion to suppress, no standard of review applies. 
2. In the trial court, the prosecutor did not dispute that criminal judgements in Utah 
must be signed by a judge, or that the California minute entry reflecting defendant's prior 
felony conviction here was not signed by a judge. Rather, the prosecutor argued that 
California authorizes court clerks to enter criminal judgments in the record and the minute 
entry, which was entered, signed, and certified by a California court clerk, thus comported 
with California law. Therefore, the prosecutor argued that the minute entry was valid under 
the Full Faith and Credit clause, and thus admissible to prove defendant's felony status. The 
trial court agreed. 
Is defendant entitled to a reversal of his conviction for possession of a dangerous 
weapon by a restricted person where he asserts only that the California judgment is not 
signed by a judge, and does not acknowledge or attack the basis for the trial court's ruling? 
Since defendant does not challenge the basis for the trial court's ruling admitting his 
prior felony conviction, no standard of review applies. 
2 
CONS'! 1 1 1 J I ION. \ I PRO V ISIONS, S I V I I I I E S , A N D RULES 
[ Jt a h R . A | »p IP 2 4 (. i)(9): . 
An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the grounds for 
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with. citations to the 
authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a 
fact finding must first marshal all record eviden.ce that supports the challenged 
finding. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
C h a r g e . Defendant was charged with purchase, transfer, possession i .^ < r a. 
5(jif ? - West 2004 v c:;rrvi~i: a concealed dangerous weapon, a class A misdemeanor, in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-504(l)(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 20fP~2008); and false 
personal information to a peace officer, a class C misdemeanor, \\\ \ loLduwii v*l L : All I . -UL)E 
^ l\] N § 76-8- 507(1)0 * ] < • Jt 2004 } • I : 1 2. 
• Motion to suppress denied. Defendant, a passenger in a vehicle stopped for a routine 
1
 -irH; • iolation, moved to suppress a firearm seized during a warrantless search incident to 
Ins diiest Inn a s.iklU In ll \ inLilnui I1 I1* 'i I I hn pioseimini ilnl nul di,.puU llhil llic salcly 
belt violation was an invalid basis for the arrest. R68 ("Defense counsel is correct in his 
reading of the seatbelt statute in that it must be enforced as secondary action to the detention 
of the passenger ^. i ; . .^. ; . fa copy of the State' s Response ;., ^ei^i iJani s vu-imn fo 
Suppress is i/oittainrii in ,uM< ill iillllliiiiiiiiiiiiiii I R n i l h i T , l l i c S h i l e n n u m d fhnf i l r l ' r n i l . ' i i i f s J I T C S ) W H S 
justified because there was objective probable cause to believe he had committed another 
3 
offense: interference with an officer. Id.; see also id. at 66-67 (discussing UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-8-305(3) (West 2004) and Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004)). The trial court 
was initially uncertain about the prosecutor's argument: "I'm not quite sure I buy that. I've 
got to review the cases on that one. And I'll render a decision hopefully this coming week." 
R239:33. Pictures of the firearm were subsequently admitted at the jury trial. See id. at 115-
121; see also State Exh. ##1-2. 
Motion in limine granted* To convict defendant for being a restricted person in 
possession of a firearm the prosecutor had to prove that defendant had a prior felony 
conviction. See § 76-10-503(3)(a). Accordingly, the prosecutor moved the trial court to 
admit a minute entry reflecting defendant's November 1997 felony drug conviction, which 
was signed and certified by a deputy clerk of the Superior Court of California, Los Angeles 
County. See R88-96 (a copy of the State's Motion in Limine (minus attached exhibits) is 
contained in addendum B); see also State Exh. # 8 (a copy is contained in addendum D). 
The prosecutor acknowledged that the California minute entry did not comport with Utah 
law, which requires trial courts to enter final judgment. R91. The prosecutor argued, 
however, that the minute entry did comport with California law, which allowed "a document 
for a final judgment of a conviction [to] be certified by the clerk of the court, or by the 
judge." Id. (discussing Cal. Penal Code § 1207 (West 2005), and People v. Cuandra, 225 
Cal. App. 2d 728, 731 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964)). The prosecutor thus asked the trial court to 
admit the California judgment, which he argued was entitled to full faith and credit under 
U.S. CONST. Article IV, § 1, and 28 U.S.C. § 1738. R93-95. 
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The parties orally argued the motion in limine See R239:33-45 (the pertinent 
lianst up) pages »iih. uiiit.imeil iiiiii iiihU IHIIIIII "I I I 'pun ijmestninnig from Ilk tii.il i ourl Ihn1 
prosecutor explained that California courts "enter vHements in the minutes." Id. at 35. 
Specifically, "they use a minute entry or docket entry, [and] certify" that with the signature 
of WJC: uorK. /,. ictense counsel i,. , .... ....*: r.e ^rtiiiej nnnuie entry was a judgment 
i l l ' i inn u l in i i , iiiiii! Ili.il .1 (iKli'iiiiii'iit ft i i m n linn li.nl in l.nl IKVH "ontned in the iinmili s 
as required by California law Id. at 36-39; The trial court agreed with the prosecutor, 
however, and admitted the California judgment "as a satisfaction of the prior conviction 
i i /qui i i i i iei i t1 la .ml III II llir In ill i IMIII II un Il III ill (In minute nilir\ hud bum iMilrii ill IIIIII iilllln. 
minutes" and "certified by a clerk of the court," and thus concluded that it complied with 
California law. Id,; see also id, at 42 (" , I am of the opinion thai h-cal*. this satisfies the 
entry by the clerk in the minutes vv ith a brief statement of the onense toi ^hi^n ^^nswi^n 
:vv as had !""> n i it has been certified, a s the officia 1 coi * * i 
by clerks. You know, that's the only way court records are normally made except h\ a ck-rk 
of a judge"). i'hu>, the i J. j~v~t accorded the California judgment full until and ..; ^
 :.i ;. 
Il llh | II , nalil 'I. - ' • • 
Conviction. Defendant was convicted by a jury as charged. R208-210. 
Sentence, The trial court imposed an indeterminate term of zero to five years for the 
thii ::l degree felony, and concurrent k.;:... -, ^ ;. . . .... demeanor, 
90 days in jail for the class C misdemeanor R 226-227. 
Notice of appeal. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R232. 
5 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Officer Hammond of the Ogden City Police Department stopped a truck for having 
no license plate light. R239:5-6. As Officer Hammond spoke with the driver, defendant, the 
front seat passenger, interrupted with questions about the stop. Id. at 7, 17. Officer 
Hammond explained to defendant that he needed to speak with the driver, but defendant 
persisted in questioning the validity of the traffic stop, becoming "confrontational and 
argumentative." Id. at 102. Eventually, Officer Hammond found it impossible to conduct his 
investigation "over the voicetures [sic] or vulgarities . . . of the defendant." Id. at 19. When 
defendant began cursing and using vulgarity, the officer asked him for his identification. Id. 
at 7-8. 
Defendant claimed he did not have any identification, but said he was from California. 
Id. at 8-9. Officer Hammond then asked defendant for his name and date of birth. Id. at 8. 
Defendant said his name was Jesus Hernandez and his date of birth was "three eighteen 
nineteen." Id. When Officer Hammond asked defendant for his social security number, 
defendant "stumbled through the numbers." Id. 
After obtaining both the driver's and defendant's information, Officer Hammond 
returned to his patrol car to run computer checks, but he was unable to confirm defendant's 
information and identification. Id. at 9. He returned to the truck and asked defendant if he 
had anything with his name on it. Id. Defendant said that he did not. Id. Officer Hammond 
6 
decided to issue defendant a citation for not wearing a seat belt, but could not due to 
defendant's lack of identification.1 Id. at 10. 
At this point, Officer Hammond requested the driver to step out of the vehicle to speak 
with him. Id, While talking with the driver, the officer continued to observe defendant in 
the vehicle talking on a cell phone. Id, at 10,20. After speaking with the driver outside the 
vehicle, Officer Hammond radioed dispatch for another unit to come to the scene. Id, at 11. 
The officer watched defendant as he "was leaning very close to the passenger door. And just 
fidgeting slightly, which was kind of increasing [his] level of awareness." Id, Officer 
Hammond began to suspect defendant was "hiding something or trying to conceal 
something." Id, at 12; see also id. at 109. 
When another officer arrived at the scene, Officer Hammond asked defendant to step 
out of the vehicle. Id. at 11. As defendant did so, he "stayed very close to the vehicle and 
just kind of quickly closed the door." Id. at 12; see also id. at 110-111. Officer Hammond 
placed defendant in handcuffs and arrested him for not wearing a seatbelt. Id, at 12, 18. 
When the officer searched defendant incident to the arrest, he discovered a wallet with a 
California driver's license issued to defendant with his name listed as Angel Hernandez, date 
of birth 18 April 1975. Id. at 12-13. A computer check revealed that defendant had also 
given the officer a false social security number. Id. at 113. A search of the passenger 
Officer Hammond explained at trial that the Ogden City Police Department has "a 
policy . . . that says that if [an officer] cannot verify [a suspect's] identity with a picture 
I.D., [the officer must] make an arrest," and "cannot issue a citation and set that person 
free." Id. at 108. 
7 
compartment revealed a black semi-automatic 9-millimeter handgun between the door and 
the passenger seat. Id, at 12-13; see also id, at 115, and State's Exh. ## 1-2. Although no 
round was chambered, "[t]here were eight 9-millimeter rounds inside the magazine that was 
inserted in the gun." Id, at 117. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I. Defendant challenges the trial court's ruling denying his motion to suppress 
the firearm, but fails to attack the apparent basis for the trial court's ruling. For example, in 
trial court, the prosecutor did not dispute defendant's claim that Officer Hammond's reliance 
on the safety belt statute as a basis for arresting defendant was invalid. Rather, the 
prosecutor argued that defendant's arrest was objectively justified because there was 
probable cause to believe he had committed another offense: interference with an officer. The 
trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress without explanation. 
On appeal, defendant attacks only Officer Hammond's reliance on the safety belt 
statute, the ground abandoned by the prosecutor below. Defendant does not attack the 
evident basis for the court's ruling denying his motion to suppress, that his arrest was 
objectively justified because there was probable cause to believe that he committed the 
offense of interference with an officer. Consequently, defendant does not challenge the 
apparent basis of the trial court's ruling denying his motion to suppress. His claim is 
therefore inadequately briefed. This Court should thus affirm. 
Point II. Defendant also challenges the trial court's admission of a certified minute 
entry reflecting his 1997 felony drug conviction in California, which was entered and signed 
8 
by a California court clerk. Although the certified minute entry is not signed by a judge, as 
would be required under Utah law, it does comport with California law, which authorizes 
court clerks to enter criminal judgments in the record. Therefore, the prosecutor argued that 
the California judgment was entitled to full faith and credit in Utah, and was thus admissible 
to prove defendant's felony status. The trial court agreed. 
On appeal, defendant ignores the basis for the trial court's ruling admitting the 
California judgment—the Full Faith and Credit Clause—and continues to assert only that the 
minute entry does not comport with Utah law because it is not signed by a judge. 
Consequently, defendant's challenge to the trial court's ruling is inadequately briefed. This 
Court should therefore affirm. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO REVERSAL OF HIS JURY 
CONVICTIONS WHERE HE ATTACKS ONLY THE GROUND 
ABANDONED BY THE PROSECUTOR AND NOT THE EVIDENT BASIS 
FOR THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING DENYING HIS MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS THE FIREARM 
In Point I of his brief, defendant challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to 
suppress a firearm discovered during a search incident to his arrest for a safety belt violation. 
Aplt. Br. at 13-19. Defendant asserts that "the officer had no authority to arrest [him] for an 
infraction for which there [was] no possibility of jail." Aplt. Br. at 17; see also id. at 18 ("In 
the present case the only violation for which the officer acknowledged arresting the 
defendant was an infraction, one not subject to arrest"). Defendant's argument overlooks that 
9 
the prosecutor did not dispute this claim below. See R68. Rather, the prosecutor argued that 
defendant's arrest—and the incident search—were objectively justified because there was 
probable cause to believe that he committed another offense: interference with an officer. 
See R66-67 (discussing UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-305 (West 2004) mdDevenpeck v. Alford, 
543 U.S. 146 (2004)); see also R239:25-33. The trial court denied defendant's motion to 
suppress the firearm without explanation. Because defendant attacks only the ground 
abandoned by the prosecutor and not the evident basis for the court's ruling, his challenge 
is inadequately briefed. 
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires that the argument portion 
of appellant's brief "shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect 
to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the 
trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." 
As Utah courts have frequently reiterated, "a reviewing court is entitled to have the 
issues clearly defined with pertinent authority cited and is not simply a depository in which 
the appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research." State v. Gomez, 2002 
UT 120, f 20, 63 P.3d 72 (quoting State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,450 (Utah 1988) (in turn 
quoting Williamson v. Opsahl, 416 N.E.2d 783, 784 (111. App. Ct. 1981))). Thus, when the 
appellant fails to present any relevant authority, the reviewing court will "decline to find it 
for him." State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, ^ 12, 69 P.3d 1278 (rejecting prosecutorial 
misconduct challenge). Similarly, "[w]hen aparty fails to offer any meaningful analysis, [the 
court will] decline to reach the merits." State v. Garner, 2002 UT App 234, ^ 12, 52 P.3d 
10 
467. An appellant must, in addition to citing cases, "explain why. . . the cases cited compel 
this court to reverse the district court . . ." Id. 
"Utah courts routinely decline to consider inadequately briefed arguments." State v. 
Bryant, 965 P.2d 539, 549 (Utah App. 1998) (citing State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 
(Utah 1989)); State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984); State v. Yates, 834 P.2d 
599, 602 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249 (Utah App. 1992)). See also 
State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, % 28, 48 P.3d 872, cert, denied, 535 U.S. 1062 (2002); State 
v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, H 13, 72 P.3d 138. 
Where, as here, an appellant fails to attack the basis of the judgement below, his 
argument is inadequately briefed and the judgment should be affirmed. Cf. State v. 
Sorenson, 2004 UT App 3 8 lu, at 1 (affirming where Sorenson failed to challenge two of three 
bases for the trial court's ruling: "Sorenson does not challenge these determinations on 
appeal and, accordingly, we find no reason to reverse the trial court's denial of Sorenson's 
motion to suppress"). Accord San Antonio Press, Inc. v. Custom Bilt Machinery, 852 
S. W.2d 64,65 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) ("When a separate and independent ground that supports 
a judgment is not challenged on appeal, the appellate court must affirm"); see also James v. 
Phoenix Gen. Hosp., Inc. 744 P.2d 689, 694 (Ariz. 1986) (affirming judgment below on an 
uncontested issue); Shrader v. Eli Lily & Co., 639 N.E.2d 258, 264 (Ind. 1994) (affirming 
judgment below "[bjecause appellants have not successfully challenged one of the 
independent grounds supporting summary judgment"). Defendant attacks the ground 
abandoned by the prosecutor below, but makes no challenge to the apparent basis for the trial 
11 
court's ruling. See Aplt. Br. at 13-19. Thus, although defendant's brief contains legal 
authority and analysis, it wholly fails to explain why the cited authorities compel this Court 
to reverse the evident basis of the trial court's ruling, that there was probable cause to arrest 
defendant for interference with an officer. Id. Defendant's brief does not acknowledge or 
even mention the trial court's apparent rationale. Id. Accordingly, defendant's argument is 
inadequately briefed and his challenge to the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress 
should be rejected. See, e.g., Norris, 2001 UT 104,1f 28; Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, f 13. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A REVERSAL OF HIS 
CONVICTION FOR POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON BY A 
RESTRICTED PERSON WHERE HE FAILS TO ATTACK THE BASIS 
FOR THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING 
In Point II of his brief, defendant challenges the admission of a prior felony conviction 
in the state of California to prove his restricted status under UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-
503(3)(a) (West2004). Aplt. Br. at 19-24. Defendant does not, however, challenge the basis 
for the trial court's ruling admitting the California judgment—the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause. Consequently, defendant's challenge to admission of his California felony 
conviction fails for the same his reason that his challenge to admission of his firearm failed: 
it is inadequately briefed. See Point I above. 
As set out in the Statement of the Case, the trial court admitted a certified California 
minute entry reflecting defendant's 1997 felony conviction as proof of his restricted felony 
status. R239:40-42. There was no dispute below that the California minute entry was not 
12 
signed by a judge, or that Utah judgments are required to be so signed. See R91. The trial 
court found, however, that the certified minute entry comported with California law, which 
authorizes court clerks to enter criminal judgements, and that it was therefore entitled to full 
faith and credit in Utah, See R239:40-42. 
On appeal, defendant continues to assert that Utah criminal judgements must be 
signed by a judge and that the California minute entry is not signed by a judge. Aplt. Br. at 
19-24. While a Utah judgment of conviction that is not signed by a judge may be invalid to 
prove a defendant's restricted status, a Utah judgment is not at issue here. Rather, the felony 
judgment at issue is out of California. R239:40-42; see also Exh. # 8. As noted above, the 
trial court found that California law authorizes entry of judgment by the court clerk, see9 
R239:40-42, and defendant does not challenge that finding on appeal. Indeed, defendant 
does not acknowledge the basis for the trial court's ruling in his brief, and does not dispute 
either that the certified minute entry comports with California law, or that it must be 
accorded full faith and credit under the federal constitution. See Aplt. Br. at 19-24. Thus, 
although defendant's brief contains legal authority and analysis, it wholly fails to explain 
why the cited authorities compel this Court to reverse the trial court's ruling. See id. 
Based on the above, and as more fully set out in Point I, where, as here, defendant 
fails to support his claim with relevant authority, and fails to attack the basis of the trial 
court's ruling, it is inadequately briefed and should be rejected. See, e.g., Pritchett, 2003 UT 
24, % 12; Garner, 2002 UT App 234, f 12. Cf. Sorenson, 2004 UT App 381u, at L Accord 
13 
San Antonio Press, Inc., 852 S.W.2d at 65; see also James, 744 P.2d at 694; Shrader, 639 
N.E.2dat264. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress should be affirmed, as 
should defendant's jury convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on _Q_ April 2008. 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
DECKER 
assistant Attorney General 
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Addenda 
Addendum A 
BRANDEN B. MILES, UBN # 9777 
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
2380 WASHINGTON BLVD., 2ND FLOOR 
OGDEN, UTAH 84401 
TELEPHONE: (801)-399-8377 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, STATE'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S 
* MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ANGEL JESUS HERNANDEZ Case No. 051903167 
* 
Defendant. Judge: ROGER S. DUTSON 
The State objects to Defendant's Motion to Suppress and respectfully moves this Court to 
deny Defendant's motion. The State's argument is more fully set forth below. 
FACTS 
On February 14, 2005, Defendant was a passenger in an automobile stopped by Officer 
Kenneth Hammond of the Ogden City Police Department. Officer Hammond stopped the 
vehicle for not having a license plate light. As Officer Hammond was beginning to talk to the 
driver, the passenger, later identified as the Defendant, began to interrupt his conversation with 
the driver. The Defendant was questioning Officer Hammond about the vahdity of the stop. He 
than became extremely vulgar to the officer and began cursing. The Defendant kept interrupting 
Officer Hammond in his attempts to deal with the driver. Officer Hammond testified at the 
preliminary hearing that the Defendant would not let him deal with the driver. Officer Hammond 
told the Defendant that the purpose and vahdity of the stop were not his concern, but the 
aftww n P®S% 
Defendant continued to engage the officer. Officer Hammond testified that he could not have 
ignored the Defendant or reasonably continued the investigation of the driver because of the 
Defendant's constant, vulgar interruptions. The Defendant was also not wearing a seat belt. 
Officer Hammond asked for the Defendant's information. Admittedly, Officer Hammond 
stated that he believed he could cite the Defendant for not wearing a seat belt. Officer Hammond 
also testified that he felt the Defendant was interfering with his attempts to deal with the driver. 
The Defendant verbally gave him false information. Upon running the Defendant's information, 
Officer Hammond could not find anything with the information the Defendant provided. Officer 
Hammond returned the vehicle to ask the Defendant for identification, but the Defendant denied 
that he had any. Officer Hammond then arrested the Defendant for the seat belt violation. 
ARGUMENT 
I. OFFICER HAMMOND WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY JUSTIFIED IN 
REQUESTING THE DEFENDANT'S IDENTIFICATION AND EVENTUALLY 
ARRESTING THE DEFENDANT BECAUSE HE WAS INTERFERING WITH 
THE DETENTION OF THE DRIVER. 
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states that, !![t]he right of the people to 
be secure in their houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated " U.S. CONST, amend. IV. Similarly, the Utah Constitution provides that, 
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and 
seizures shall not be violated " UTAH CONST, art. I § 14. The U.S. Constitution does not 
forbid all searches and seizures, but only unreasonable searches and seizures. Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 9 (1968). For a warrantless arrest to be reasonable under the U.S. Constitution, it must be 
supported by probable cause. Florida v. Rover. 460 U.S. 491,499 (1983). 
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Probable cause exists when "'the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] 
knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in 
themselves to warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is 
being committed." State v. Dorsev. 731 P.2d 1085,1088 (Utah 1986)f quoting Brinegar v. 
United States. 338 U.S. 160,175-76 (1949)). When applying this standard it is important to note 
that "[t]he validity of the probable cause determination is made from the objective standpoint of 
a 'prudent, reasonable, cautious police officer... guided by his experience and training.9" Id. 
(quoting United States v. Davis, 458 R2d 819, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1972). This is because "[p]olice 
officers by virtue of their experience and training can sometimes recognize illegal activity where 
ordinary citizens would not." Id. Consequently, "[determinations of whether probable cause 
exists require a common sense assessment of the totality of the circumstances confronting th& 
arresting... officer." State v. Spurgeon. 904 P.2d 220,226 (Utah App. 1995). Finally, it is 
important to remember that the probable cause standard is lower than the preponderance of the 
evidence standard in civil cases. State v. Talbot 972 P.2d 435,437 (Utah 1998). 
Regardless of whether the Officer stated a reason for arrest based on valid probable cause 
at the time of the arrest, or whether he stated another reason for arrest is irrelevant as long as 
valid probable cause actually did exist. The United States Supreme Court has considered 
whether an officer needs to identify the basis for probable cause at the time of arrest correctly, 
and has determined unequivocally that he does not. "A warrantless arrest by a law officer is 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if, given the facts known to the officer, there is 
probable cause to believe that a crime has been or is being committed. [The requirement] that 
the offense establishing probable cause must be 'closely related' to, and based on the same 
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conduct as, the offense the arresting officer identifies at the time of arrest—is inconsistent with 
this Court's precedent, which holds that an arresting officer's state of mind (except for facts that 
he knows) is irrelevant to probable cause." Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146,125 S. Ct. 588, 
590 (2004). 
In Devenpeck, an officer pulled over the defendant motorist because he believed the 
defendant was impersonating a police officer. During the encounter, the officer observed that the 
defendant was recording the traffic stop. The officer arrested the defendant for violating 
Washington State's Privacy Act. Later, the district court dismissed that charge because taping a 
traffic stop is not a crime in Washington. The jury found that the officer nevertheless had 
probable cause to arrest even though taping a traffic stop was not illegal. On appeal, the Ninth 
Circuit ruled that the officer could not rely on the evidence that the defendant was impersonating 
an officer for probable cause to arrest, because the officer's stated probable cause for arrest was 
for taping the traffic stop, not for impersonating an officer. The United States Supreme Court 
reversed the Ninth Circuit. Id. 
The Court explained that the critical issue was whether facts objectively existed justifying 
probable cause, not the officer's subjective incorporation of those facts into his stated reason-for 
making the arrest. That is, the facts justifying probable cause simply has to exist—the officer 
does not have to acknowledge them at the time of the arrest. "Our cases make clear that an 
arresting officer's state of mind (except for the facts that he knows) is irrelevant to the existence 
of probable cause. That is to say, his subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the 
criminal offense as to which the known facts provide probable cause. As we have repeatedly 
explained, 'the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the 
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reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action 
taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.'" Id. at 593-94 
fquoting Wliren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-13(1996)). Further, "'[T]he Fourth 
Amendment's concern with "reasonableness" allows certain actions to be taken in certain 
circumstances, whatever the subjective intent.'" Devenpeck, 125 S. Ct. at 594 (quoting Whren, 
517 U.S. at 814). Finally, "'[E]venhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the application of 
objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the subjective state of 
mind of the officer.'" Devenpeck. 125 S. Ct. at 594 (quoting Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 
138 (1990)). 
In allowing an unstated basis for probable cause to support an arrest even when an officer 
identifies another, possibly invalid, basis for probable cause, the Court also considered whether 
the real probable cause and the stated probable cause had to be "closely related." That is, must 
the offense establishing the real probable cause be closely related to, and based on the same 
conduct as, the offense which the officer identifies at the time of arrest? The Supreme Court said 
no. 
Such a rule makes the lawfulness of an arrest turn upon the motivation of the 
arresting officer-eliminating, as validating probable cause, facts that played no 
part in the officer's expressed subjective reason for making the arrest, and offenses 
that are not "closely related" to that subjective reason. This means that the 
constitutionality of an arrest under a given set of known facts will "vary from 
place to place and from time to time," depending on whether the arresting officer 
states the reason for the detention and, if so, whether he correctly identifies a 
general class of offense for which probable cause exists. An arrest made by a 
knowledgeable, veteran officer would be valid, whereas an arrest made by a 
rookie in precisely the same circumstances would not. We see no reason to 
ascribe to the Fourth Amendment such arbitrarily variable protection. 
Devenpeck. 125 S. Ct. at 594 (internal citations omitted). 
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Summarizing, the Court emphasized that an officer's subjective reasons for making an 
arrest are irrelevant where the arrest finds support in objective—though possibly 
different—reasons. "Subjective intent of the arresting officer, however it is determined (and of 
course subjective intent is always determined by objective means), is simply no basis for 
invalidating an arrest. Those are lawfully arrested whom the facts known to the arresting officers 
give probable cause to arrest." Id. 
Officer Hammond's articulated basis for asking for the Defendant's information was • 
admittedly the seat belt violation. Defense counsel is correct in his reading of the seatbelt statute 
in that it must be enforced as secondary action to the detention of the passenger himself. 
However, Officer Hammond clearly articulated and was justified in demanding the Defendant's 
information because the Defendant was interfering with the detention of the driver in violation of 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-305 as follows: 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has knowledge, or by the 
exercise of reasonable care should have knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking 
to effect a lawful arrest or detention of that person or another and interferes with 
the arrest or detention by: . . . 
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to refrain from performing 
any act that would impede the arrest or detention. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-305. 
In this case, the Defendant was interfering with the detention of the driver by constantly 
interrupting the officer and the driver. He was vulgar and swearing. He stated that the thought 
the traffic stop was unlawful. Officer Hammond told him that the stop was not his concern, but 
the Defendant continued to interrupt him and impede his ability to conduct the purpose of the 
stop with the driver. 
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Defendant Hernandez is in a similar situation to the defendant in American Fork City v. 
Pena-Flores. 63 P.3d 675 (Utah 2002). In Pena-Flores, the officer had stopped suspected gang 
members to update information and photographs. The defendant, Luis Pena-Flores, who was 
unknown to the officers, approached and began to tell the "detainees they did not have to go with 
the police, answer questions, or have their pictures taken." Id at 677. One officer told the 
defendant to keep quiet and step back, but the defendant ignored these commands and he 
continued to verbally agitate the other people. Eventually, Pena-Flores was arrested for 
interfering with the peace officers seeking to effect a lawful detention. Id. 
Pena-Flores appealed his conviction for interfering should be overturned because he 
claimed the arrest or detention of the other people were unlawful. Id at 677-78. The Utah 
Supreme Court upheld his conviction stating that it "is clear that Pena-Flores' acts were impeding 
the detention in question." Id at 679. The Court held the defendant was clearly violating the 
interfering statute for the following reasons: (1) the officers were clearly identified; (2) they were 
effecting a lawful detention of others; (3) the defendant was agitating others and encouraging 
noncompliance with the officers; (4) the defendant was told to keep quite and step back; and (5) 
the defendant continued to interfere with the detention. Id at 678-79. 
Similarly, Defendant Hernandez was a passenger in an automobile lawfully detained by a 
clearly identified and uniformed officer. The Defendant began to harass the officer verbally and 
obstructed his ability to continue his conversation with the driver. He challenged the legality of 
the stop thereby encouraging noncompliance by the driver. He was told by Officer Hammond 
that the stop of the driver did not concern him because he was not driving. The Defendant 
continued to express his extreme concerns about the stop in a very vulgar manner. Thus, the 
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officer clearly had probable cause to detain and arrest the Defendant for interfering with his 
detention of the driver. 
Probable cause to arrest is an objective standard and we cannot fault Officer Hammond 
simply because he identified a different or ultimately illegal basis for the detention. Davenpeck, 
543 U.S. at 593-94. So long as, at the time of the detention, Officer Hammond had sufficient 
facts within his knowledge that it would warrant a person of reasonable caution and prudence to 
believe that an offense was being committed, then he had probable cause to detain or arrest the 
Defendant. Id., see also Dorsev, 731 P.2d at 1088. Therefore, viewed objectively, Officer 
Hammond had probable cause to believe that the Defendant was interfering with his detention of 
the driver and was constitutional justified in asking the Defendant for his information. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court must view the question of probable cause objectively to determine whether the 
facts and circumstances with Officer Hammond's knowledge were reasonably trustworthy and 
sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that5 an offense 
was being committed. Based on these objective facts, Officer Hammond had probable cause to 
detain and arrest the Defendant for interfering with his detention of the driver. We cannot fault 
Officer Hammond for identifying a different or otherwise impermissible basis for detaining the 
Defendant because it is an objective standard. Therefore, the Defendant's motion is without 
merit and the State respectfully request this Court deny the Defendant's motion. 
DATED this day of May 2006. 
l>ffr/vL. (y /%%« 
Branden B. Miles 
Deputy County Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing State's Response to 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress, was mailed, postage pre-paid, to the following: 
Martin Gravis 
Attorney for Defendant Angel Hernandez 
2562 Washington Blvd. 
Ogden,UT 84401 
DATED this * l day of May 2006. 
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051903167 HERNANDE^ANGEL JESUS 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
V. 
ANGEL JESUS HERNANDEZ, 
Defendant. 
AUG 1 6 
STATE'S MOTION IN LIMINE AND 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
2006 
CASE No. 051903167 
Judge: ROGER S. DUTSON 
The State of Utah, represented by Branden B. Miles, Deputy County Attorney, 
respectfully requests this Court to allow the State to introduce evidence of Defendant's prior 
felony conviction for the manufacture of a controlled substance. The State's argument is more 
fully set forth below. 
FACTS 
On April 5, 2000, the Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los 
Angeles accepted Defendant's, Angel Jesus Hernandez's, plea of guilty to the manufacture of 
methamphetamine, a felony punishable by prison. ATTACHED EXHIBIT. Throughout the 
proceeding Defendant was represented by Jeffrey Zimel, Deputy Public Defender. Defendant was 
advised of, and personally and explicitly waived, his constitutional rights and entered the guilty 
plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Also, Defendant was notified of a possible 
enhancement if convicted of a felony in the future. Def s Transcript p. 3 % 13-24 April 5, 2000. 
Consequently, Defendant served 365 days in Los Angeles County Jail and was put on probation. 
ATTACHED EXHIBIT. 
ARGUMENT 
I. EVIDENCE CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S PRIOR BAD ACTS ARE ADMISSIBLE 
UNDER RULES 803(22) AND 902(4) BECAUSE THE DOCUMENTS ARE 
PROPERLY AUTHENTICATED WITH CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT 
CLERK AND ARE PROPERLY DOCUMENTED WITH A CLEAR STATEMENT OF 
A FELONY CONVICTION. 
Under Rule 803(22) of Utah Rules of Evidence, a judgment of previous conviction is 
admissible if it is (1) a final judgment after trial or upon plea of guilty; (2) adjudging a person 
guilty of a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; and (3) proving any fact 
essential to sustain the judgment. U.R.E. Rule 803(22). In order to charge a person with 
possession of a firearm by a restricted person, as a 3rd degree felony, the defendant must have a 
prior felony conviction. Also, a prior felony conviction is, in itself, a final judgment after trial or 
upon plea of guilty. Therefore, under Rule 803(22), proof a prior felony conviction is essential to 
convict a person of possession of a firearm by a restricted person, after a plea of guilty or trial 
Consequently, proof of a prior felony conviction is admissible evidence. 
Furthermore, documentation to prove that a felony conviction had taken place must be 
properly authenticated to be admissible. Rule 902(4) of the Utah Rules of Evidence has three 
requirements for a copy of an official record to be self-authenticating: (1) a copy of an official 
report; (2) authorized by law to be recorded or filed and actually recorded and filed in a public 
office; and (3) certified as correct by the custodian of other person authorized to make the 
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certification. U.R.E. Rule 902(4). Therefore, an official must certify the document that refers to a 
felony conviction for a person to be classified as a restricted person. State v. Higginbotham, 917 
P.2d 545, 548 (Utah 1996). 
For example, in Higginbotham, the defendant was charged with possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person. Id. However, the court found that the two documents 
provided by the prosecution were inadequate to determine that the defendant had been convicted 
of a felony. The first document was an affidavit for a parol violation signed by a prosecuting 
attorney and stamped with a judge's name, without certification, and had stated that the 
defendant had plead guilty to a felony. The second document was a copy of a bench warrant, 
signed by a deputy clerk and certified by a custodian of law enforcement records, that did not 
state that the defendant was convicted of a felony. Id. at 549. Consequently, the documents failed 
to include both a certification by an official and a clear indication that the defendant had been 
convicted of a felony. Id. 
Two other cases closely parallel the holding in Higginbotham. First, like Higginbotham, 
the defendant in State v. Lamorie, 610 P.2d 342 (Utah 1980) was charged with possession of a 
dangerous weapon while on parole for a felony. Copies of court records were admitted into trial 
after a parol agent testified that the defendant had been under his supervision, yet the records 
were certified only by a notary public. Appellate court reversed the conviction since the notary's 
certification did not constitute proper authentication. Id. at 343-45. Second, the defendant in 
State v. Long, 111 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986) was charged with possession of a dangerous weapon by 
a restricted person. Certified copies from the defendant's parole file, introduced by the 
defendant's parol officer, stated that the defendant had been twice convicted of felonies. 
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However, the documents were not properly authenticated because no evidence showed that the 
documents were filed and recorded in a public office. Id. at 484,486. 
hi the state of California, a document for a final judgment of a conviction can be certified 
by the clerk of the court, or by the judge, to be properly filed and executed. Cal. Penal Code § 
1207 (Deering 2006); see also Cal. Penal Code § 1213 (Deering 2006). California's requirements 
for documentation of a final judgment are different from Utah's requirements for documentation. 
See State v. Anderson, 797 P.2d 1114,1115-16 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); c.f. Cal. Penal Code § 
1207. In Utah, a judgment of a prior conviction must be "written, clear and definite, and signed 
by the court (or the clerk in a jury case) in order to serve as the basis for enhancing a penalty." 
Anderson, 797 P.2d at 1117. However, California criminal procedure for entry of judgment 
includes: 
When judgment upon a conviction is rendered, the clerk, or if there is no clerk, the judge, 
must enter the same in the minutes, stating briefly the offense for which the conviction 
was had, and the fact of a prior conviction, if any. A copy of the judgment of conviction 
shall be filed with the papers in the case. 
Cal. Penal Code § 1207. In People v. Cuadra, 225 Cal. App. 2d 728 (Cal. Ct. App. 1964), a 
certified copy of a judgment, certified by the Clerk of the Court, entered in the minutes of the 
court with a brief history of the proceedings was upheld as a valid and final process of a criminal 
proceeding. 225 Cal. App. 2d at 731. Since the clerk has the duties, imposed by law, to "make 
and certify copy of the records and papers in his keeping,... his certificate may be accepted as 
conclusive of the facts cited therein." Id. Therefore, in the state of California, documentation of 
a judgment need only to include a statement of the offense from the clerk, without any 
documentation or entry from a judge. Id. 
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Here, the felony conviction necessary to charge Defendant as a restricted person was 
entered after a guilty plea, filed and recorded in a public place and certified by the Clerk of 
Superior Court, and, therefore, the minute entry should be allowed as admissible evidence. The 
minute entry introduced to the court conforms to California State law because the minutes are 
certified by the court clerk. 
First, the minute entry provided by the State indicates that Defendant was convicted of a 
felony and is certified by a court clerk in California to comply with the laws of the state of 
California. Defendant has previously contended that the document is not properly certified to 
prove a prior conviction because a judge did not sign the minutes. However, the document is valid 
according to California laws because the conviction was documented to comply with California 
Penal Code §1207. 
Second, according to Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 803(22), the minute entry is admissible 
as evidence. The minute entry clearly indicates that Defendant pleaded guilty to a felony in the 
state of California. Furthermore, the minute entry shows that Defendant was represented by an 
attorney, Jeffrey Zimel, and that Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his Constitutional 
rights to a trial; therefore, the California judgment is valid. Additionally, the fact that Defendant 
has been convicted of a felony is essential to sustain a judgment for possession of a firearm by a 
restricted person. Therefore, under Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 803(22), the minute entry should 
be allowed into evidence. 
Finally, Utah Rule of Evidence Rule 902(4) supports the admissibility of the minute entry. 
The minute entry is a copy of an official report that was filed in the Eastern Judicial District, 
County of Los Angeles, State of California on November 21,1997. Furthermore, the entry is 
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certified as correct by "John A. Clarke, Executive Officer/Clerk of Superior Court, County of Los 
Angeles, State of California." 
II. THE FULL-FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE 
FEDERAL STATUTE ALLOWS UTAH TO ACKNOWLEDGE FINAL JUDGMENTS, 
INCLUDING CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS, FROM FOREIGN STATES. 
The Full Faith and Credit clause, Article IV, § 1 of the United States Constitution, states 
that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial 
Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in 
which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." U.S. Const. 
art. IV, §1. Congress has implemented the constitutional full faith and credit clause to include: 
Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have 
the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and 
Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or 
Possession from which they are taken. 
28U.S.C. §1738. 
The full faith and credit clause, in either its federal constitutional or statutory incarnations, 
is meant to guide the courts when a question arises as to whether faith and credit is to be given by 
the court to the records and judicial proceedings of a state other than that in which the court is 
sitting. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174,182 (1988). The general constitutional command is 
for every state to give to judgment at least res judicata effect to judgments which would be 
allotted in the state which rendered it. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106,109 (1963). Also, as a 
general rule, judgment is entitled to full faith and credit when the "second court's inquiry 
discloses that those questions have been fully and fairly litigated and finally decided in the court 
which rendered the original judgment." Id. at 111. To transform an "aggregation of independent, 
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sovereign State into a nation," adherence to foreign state judgments validly adjudicated is a way 
to try matters effectively and efficiently. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222,233 (1998). 
Moreover, with proper authentication on court documents, the presumption is that the 
court "imports absolute verity and is final and conclusive." Idaho v. Prince, 132 P.2d 146,148 
(Idaho 1942). Therefore, judgments are proof of what they show in their face and are the "best and 
only competent evidence thereof." Id. 
To not enforce the penal judgment of a foreign state would lead to absurd results: "To say, 
however, that the offender is ca new man', and 'as innocent as if he had never committed the 
offense', is to ignore the difference between the crime and the criminal. A person adjudged guilty 
of an offense is a convicted criminal " People v. Laino, 87 P.3d 27, 34 (Cal. 2004) (citing 
People v. Biggs, 71 P.2d 214 (1937)). Therefore, this Court should allow the minute entry into 
evidence to show that Defendant was convicted of a felony in the state of California. 
If this Court were to dismiss California state judgments because the judge does not sign 
the judgments, Utah laws would become enigmatic. For example, convicted Californian sex 
offenders would not need to register in Utah; convicted Californian murderers could legally 
possess weapons; or convicted Californian felons could legally possess weapons in Utah. The 
State would be powerless to prosecute these offenders because a lack of admissible evidence. 
Consequentially, the minute entry should be allowed as evidence of a prior felony conviction in 
accordance to both Utah and California laws. 
Here, the full faith and credit clause guides this court to treat California convictions the 
same as Utah convictions by recognizing documents from California that facially indicate that the 
conviction is final and conclusive. To further the purpose of statutory and constitutional federal 
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law, a certified document that says Defendant was "convicted" of "count (01)" "H&S FEL -
MANUFACTURE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE" should be acknowledge as a final and 
conclusive conviction. 
The document is competent evidence to establish a prior felony conviction. Defendant is a 
convicted felon. Upholding the California judgment would further Utah's legal policy of 
preventing felons from possessing weapons. 
CONCLUSION 
The minute entry is a valid document to show that Defendant is a convicted felon 
according to California state law and is admissible evidence according to Utah state law. 
Certification from the court clerk, rather than a signature from a judge, is necessary to validate the 
official document. Moreover, the authenticated document is valid to find that Defendant's 
conviction is final and conclusive. The minute entry should, therefore, be admitted into evidence. 
DATED this 1 P*1 day of August 2006. 
Branden B. Miles 
Deputy Weber County Attorney 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing State *s Motion in Limine and 
Memorandum in Support Thereof, was mailed, postage pre-paid, to the following: 
Martin V. Gravis 
Attorney for Defendant Angel Hernandez 
2562 Washington Blvd. 
Ogdea,UT 84401 
DATED this \ \ day of August 2006. 
Jbi-^J 
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ELSE. BUT AGAIN, AS THE STATE'S ARGUING, THAT DOESN'T 
MATTER. I 'M NOT QUITE SURE I BUY THAT. I 'VE GOT TO REVIEW 
THE CASES ON THAT ONE. AND I ' L L RENDER A DECISION HOPEFULLY 
THIS COMING WEEK. I WON'T THIS WEEK. I 'VE GOT JURY TRIAL 
TOMORROW AND THE NEXT DAY AND THEN JUDGES' CONFERENCE, SO — 
MR. MILES: WHEN DID MR. HUTCHISON SEND HIS — 
THE CLERK: JUNE 19TH. 
MR. MILES: IS JUNE 19TH, DO WE WANNA PUT IT ON THAT 
DATE? 
THE COURT: THAT'LL BE FINE. 
MR. GRAVIS: ACTUALLY, LET'S PUT IT ON THE 12TH BECAUSE 
WE'VE GOT A — BECAUSE WE HAVE ANOTHER SUPPRESSION HEARING ON 
MR. HERNANDEZ'S OTHER CASE SCHEDULED ON THE 12TH. 
THE COURT: DO WE? LET'S DO IT THEN. THE 12TH OF JUNE. 
MR. GRAVIS: YOUR HONOR, MR. HERNANDEZ DOES WANNA THANK 
YOU BECAUSE HE WAS ABLE TO GET (UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
RECOMMENDATION. 
THE COURT: OH, GOOD. GOOD. OKAY. 
•k -k -k -k -k 
OGDEN, UTAH OCTOBER 2 , 2006 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. GO AHEAD WITH YOUR ARGUMENT 
THEN. 
MR. GRAVIS: I T ' S THE STATE'S MOTION. 
MR. MILES: YOUR HONOR, THIS IS THE STATE'S MOTION. DO 
YOU HAVE BEFORE YOU THEN, AND YOU SHOULD HAVE BEFORE YOU 
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ATTACHED TO OUR MOTION, A COPY OF THE CERTIFIED CONVICTIONS 
OF THE DEFENDANT AS CONTAINED IN THE MINUTE ENTRY — 
THE COURT: WELL, LET ME JUST ASK YOU A FEW QUESTIONS 
ABOUT IT. 
MR. MILES: OKAY. 
THE COURT: THE CERTIFICATION THAT YOU THINK IS 
SUFFICIENT IS THE ONE THAT'S SIGNED BY KATHY O'CONNELL, THE 
DEPUTY, RIGHT? 
MR MILES WELL, LET ME MAKE SURE. 
THE COURT: JULY 5TH OF '05. LAST PAGE OF YOUR LAST 
ATTACHMENT. 
MR. MILES: 
THE COURT: 
MR. MILES: 
THE COURT: 
OKAY. THERE ARE ACTUALLY TWO 
WELL, YOU'VE GOT — 
— COPIES OF THAT — 
— BUT — 
MR. MILES: — AND ONE OF THEM IS ACTUALLY SIGNED — 
THE COURT: — ONE OF THEM WASN'T SIGNED. 
MH MILES: HUH? 
THE COURT: ONE OF THEM WASN'T SIGNED. THE OTHER ONE 
WAS. 
MR. MILES: LET'S SEE, THAT MAY BE RIGHT. 
THE COURT: NOW, I DON'T SEE ANY STAMP OR ANY 
CERTIFICATION BY HER. THAT'S MY CONCERN. 
MR. MILES: THE ONE THAT IS NOT SIGNED IS STAMPED WITH 
THE SEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA. THAT'S THE ONE 
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MR. GRAVIS AND I WERE EXAMINING BEFORE (UNINTELLIGIBLE) AND 
THAT'S THE MINUTE ENTRY. THAT'S THE SAME COPY THAT'S NOT 
SIGNED (UNINTELLIGIBLE). 
THE COURT: AND THAT'S SIGNED BY THE COMMITTING 
MAGISTRATE? 
MR. MILES: NO. IT'S SIGNED BY THE CLERK OVER THE 
COURT. AND HER NAME, B. JASPER, EXECUTIVE OFFICER CLERK OF 
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, ATTESTED TO, 
AND IT'S KIND OF SMEARED, THE 23RD OF 2005. 
THE COURT: DO YOU HAVE THE ORIGINAL CERTIFIED ONE OF 
THAT? 
MR. MILES: I DO. THAT'S WHY I WANTED THE COURT TO 
EXAMINE THIS RECORD BECAUSE IT IS STAMPED WITH THEIR SEAL. 
THE COURT: SO BASICALLY, THEY'RE JUST USING THE DOCKET. 
MR. MILES: THEY USE A MINUTE ENTRY OR DOCKET ENTRY, 
CERTIFY THAT WITH THE SIGNATURE OF THE CLERK, AND THAT'S MY 
UNDERSTANDING OF CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE BASED ON THE RULE AND 
THE CASE WE CITED TO YOU ON PAGE 4 OF OUR BRIEF. THEY DON'T 
HAVE JUDGMENTS OF THE COURT AS WE UNDERSTAND JUDGMENTS TO BE. 
THEY ENTER JUDGMENTS IN THE MINUTES. IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS 
OTHER THAN THE SIGNATURE OF THE JUDGE — 
THE COURT: MONICA, RETURN THIS BECAUSE IT'S A VERY 
IMPORTANT DOCUMENT. 
MR. MILES: THIS — THIS DOCUMENT, YOUR HONOR, THE STATE 
MAINTAINS COMPLIES WITH ALL THE OTHER REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH 
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LAW. IT IS WRITTEN, IT IS CLEAR, AND IT IS DEFINITE IN THAT 
IT STATES THE DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED OF MANUFACTURING A 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, A FELONY PUNISHABLE BY FIVE YEARS IN 
PRISON, AS INDICATED BY THE MINUTE ENTRY THAT HAS BEEN 
CERTIFIED BEFORE THE COURT. SO IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS, IT 
MATCHES WHAT THE REQUIREMENTS FOR UTAH ARE. AND OUR POSITION 
IS THAT UNDER THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE, THIS COURT 
HAS TO GIVE THAT CALIFORNIA JUDGMENT THE WEIGHT IT WOULD BE 
GIVEN IN CALIFORNIA COURTS, WHICH WOULD THEN BE A WAY TO 
PROVE A PRIOR CONVICTION ON THE DEFENDANT'S BEHALF. 
IF YOU HAVE OTHER QUESTIONS, I'LL BE HAPPY TO RESPOND. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. MR. GRAVIS. 
MF GRAVIS: WELL, YOUR HONOR, EVEN THE CALIFORNIA 
STATUTE MR. MILES CITES IN HIS MEMORANDUM SAYS, A COPY OF THE 
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION SHALL BE FILED WITH THE PAPERS IN THE 
CASE. THAT'S WHAT THE CALIFORNIA LAW — 
THE COURT: YOU DON'T THINK THAT SATISFIES THE 
CONVICTION CERTIFICATION? 
MR. GRAVIS: NO, I DON'T BELIEVE — THAT'S NOT A 
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION. THAT'S A MINUTE ENTRY. 
MR. MILES: WHAT IS A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION IN 
CALIFORNIA, THIS IS WHAT WE'RE TOLD THEY DO. THEY DON'T HAVE 
JUDGES SIGN ORDERS LIKE WE DO IN CALIFORNIA. WE REQUESTED 
THAT SPECIFICALLY AND THEY SAID, WE DON'T DO THAT HERE. ALL 
WE DO IS THE CLERK OF THE COURT SIGNS IT AND FILES IT IN THE 
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FILE WITH THE MINUTE ENTRY. SO THEY SENT US A CERTIFIED COPY 
OF THAT BECAUSE THAT'S WHAT THEY DO IN CALIFORNIA. 
THE COURT: WELL, THE STATUTE DOES SAY ONLY MUST BE 
ENTERED — 
MR. MILES: BY A CLERK. 
THE COURT: — IN THE MINUTES, SO — 
MR. GRAVIS: WELL, ACTUALLY, IT SAYS — IT SAYS, WHEN A 
JUDGMENT UPON A CONVICTION IS RENDERED, THE CLERK OR IF 
THERE'S NO CLERK THE JUDGE MUST ENTER THE SAME IN THE 
MINUTES, STATING BRIEFLY THE OFFENSE FOR WHICH THE CONVICTION 
WAS HAD AND THE FACTS OF THE — OF A PRIOR CONVICTION IF ANY. 
A COPY OF THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION SHALL BE FILED WITH THE 
PAPERS IN THE CASE. IT SAYS IT. THAT'S — THAT'S OBVIOUSLY 
TALKING ABOUT TWO DIFFERENT DOCUMENTS. PLUS, THE MINUTE 
ENTRY DOESN'T SAY WHAT HE WAS CONVICTED OF. 
MR. MILES: IT DOES. IT SAYS, MANUFACTURING CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE. DEFENDANT PLED GUILTY TO THAT. IT'S A FELONY — 
MR. GRAVIS: (UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
THE COURT: THERE WERE — THERE WERE TWO CHARGES — AND 
IT DOES, IT DOES SAY THAT, I READ IT. THERE WERE TWO 
CHARGES. 
MR. MILES: HE PLED NOT GUILTY ORIGINALLY 
(UNINTELLIGIBLE) — 
THE COURT: ONE OF THEM — BUT I HAVE TO SAY, YOU HAVE 
TO LOOK CAREFULLY NO REALLY UNDERSTAND IT. 
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MR. MILES: CORRECT, COUNT 1 VACATED, SET ASIDE, NEW 
PLEA, GUILTY, ENTER CONVICTION, ACTUAL BASIS (UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
FIVE YEARS IN ANY STATE PRISON. AS TO COUNT 1, FORM OF 
PROBATION, ONE YEAR IN JAIL OR THREE YEARS ON PROBATION. 
DEFENDANT'S GETTING CREDIT FOR 96 DAYS IN CUSTODY, 64 DAYS 
ACTUAL. AND THEN IT GOES THROUGH ALL THE REQUIREMENTS OF 
THAT. 
MR. GRAVIS: ONE OF THE CASES THE STATE CITES IN THEIR 
MEMORANDUM, STATE VERSUS HIGGENBOTHAM, THAT WAS A CERTIFIED 
TRUE COPY OF A WARRANT FOR ARREST, AND THE COURT SAID THAT 
WASN'T GOOD ENOUGH TO PROVE A PRIOR CONVICTION FOR FELONY, 
EVEN THOUGH IT WAS FOR A WARRANT FOR ARREST FOR A PROBATION 
VIOLATION ON ALLEGED PRIOR FELONY OUT OF STATE. STATE VERSUS 
ANDERSON, THE UTAH CASES HAS ALWAYS SAID, YOU NEED A COPY OF 
THE JUDGMENT AND CONVICTION. 
MR. MILES: BUT THE — 
MR. GRAVIS: — CALIFORNIA SAYS THEY NEED TO FILE A COPY 
OF THE JUDGMENT AND CONVICTION SHALL BE FILED WITH THE PAPERS 
IN THE CASE. AND JUST BECAUSE THERE'S NOT ONE FILED DOESN'T 
MEAN THAT THEY CAN'T — MR. MILES IS NOT AN AUTHORITY ON 
CALIFORNIA LAW, BUT THE STATUTE SPEAKS FOR ITSELF, AND AS FAR 
AS HIS OPINION AS TO WHETHER THIS IS WHAT CALIFORNIA REQUIRES 
OR NOT, HE'S NOT AN EXPERT (UNINTELLIGIBLE) — 
MM MILES: BUT MR. GRAVIS HAS CITED NOTHING THAT 
INDICATES THAT THIS IS INSUFFICIENT UNDER CALIFORNIA LAW. 
39 
THE STATE'S RESEARCH HAS SHOWN TO ITS BEST KNOWLEDGE THAT 
THIS IS SUFFICIENT. AND BASED ON THE DISCUSSIONS WE'VE HAD 
WITH THE CLERKS OF THIS COURT, THAT IS THEIR PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE THERE. A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION THAT THEY 
REFERENCE IN THE STATUTE DOES NOT SO CLEARLY MEAN SOMETHING 
DIFFERENT BECAUSE THE COURT — THE STATUTE TALKS ABOUT 
ENTERING THE SAME IN THE MINUTES. AND THAT MAY BE WHAT THEY 
CONSIDER A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION. IT IS SIMPLY A 
PRONQUNCEMENT OF CONVICTION. IF THEY MAKE THAT PRONOUNCEMENT 
IN MINUTE ENTRIES, THAT'S CALIFORNIA'S PREROGATIVE. WE CAN'T 
DICTATE TO THEM HOW THEY SHOULD DO IT. THE STATE CITES THE 
UTAH CASES TO COMPARE AND SHOW IN UTAH, THIS IS WHAT WOULD BE 
REQUIRED, BUT WE HAVE SPECIFIC RULE ON POINT THAT REQUIRES A 
JUDGE TO SIGN A CONVICTION ENTERED BY A PLEA. THAT WASN'T 
COMPLIED WITH IN THOSE CASES, WHEREAS CALIFORNIA DOES NOT, 
AND SPECIFICALLY REQUIRES THE COURT CLERK TO DO IT UNLESS 
THERE IS NO COURT CLERK. THEY'RE EXACTLY OPPOSITE OF WHAT 
UTAH LAW WOULD BE. AND IN THIS CASE, A CLERK OF THE COURT 
ENTERED THOSE — CONVICTION ON THE MINUTES AND THAT ENTRY IS 
CERTIFIED BY THAT CLERK OF THE COURT. 
MR. GRAVIS: IT'S CERTIFIED BY A CLERK OF THE COURT. WE 
DON'T KNOW IF A CLERK OF THE COURT EVEN ENTERED IT ON THESE 
MINUTES. 
MR. MILES: WELL — 
THE COURT: WELL — 
<iU 
MR. GRAVIS: THAT'S STATE IS — 
THE COURT: — I — I'M GOING TO TREAT THAT AS A 
SATISFACTION OF THE PRIOR CONVICTION REQUIREMENT BECAUSE IT 
HAS BEEN ENTERED IN THE MINUTES AND IT HAS BEEN CERTIFIED BY 
A CLERK OF THE COURT. SO I AM GOING TO ALLOW THAT. IT 
APPEARS TO ME THAT IS SUFFICIENT TO COMPLY WITH THE 
CALIFORNIA STATUTE, AND I WILL GIVE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT — 
MR. GRAVIS: IS THE COURT FINDING THAT A CLERK OF THE 
COURT ENTERED THIS INTO THE MINUTES? 
THE COURT: THAT CERTIFICATION ON THE BACK STATES 
THAT — NO, NOT THAT THE CLERK ENTERED IT, THAT PARTICULAR 
CLERK ENTERED IT INTO THE MINUTES. IT DOES NOT — 
MR. GRAVIS: (UNINTELLIGIBLE) 
THE COURT: — BUT I AM GOING TO ACCEPT THAT CLERK'S 
CERTIFICATION THAT IT WAS PROPERLY ENTERED IN, AND IT'S BY A 
CLERK. 
MR. GRAVIS: BUT THAT DOESN'T — IT SAYS IT'S A 
CERTIFIED TRUE COPY. IT DOESN'T SAY THAT THAT — THAT WAS 
PREPARED BY A CLERK — 
THE COURT: HOW — HOW ELSE WOULD IT GET INTO THE — 
MR. GRAVIS: THAT'S UP TO THE STATE — 
THE COURT: — OFFICIAL COURT MINUTES? THAT'S MY 
POINT — 
MR. GRAVIS: THE STATE HAS TO PROVE EVERY ISSUE IN A 
CRIMINAL CASE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT, AND THEY — 
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THE COURT: I UNDERSTAND. 
MR. GRAVIS: ~ THEY GOTTA PROVE THAT THIS WAS A 
PROPERLY PREPARED MINUTE ENTRY THEN. IF YOU'RE GONNA ALLOW 
THAT TO BE GOOD ENOUGH, THEY STILL HAVE TO PROVE THAT IT 
WAS — IT WAS PREPARED BY A CLERK OF THE COURT. 
THE COURT: WELL, YOU KNOW, I'M NOT SURE THAT'S WHERE 
YOU WANT TO GO WITH IT BECAUSE IF THEY DO THAT, THEY'RE GOING 
TO BE GETTING INTO THE FACT THAT SUBSEQUENT TO THIS 
CONVICTION, A JUDGE CONFIRMED THAT THERE HAD BEEN A 
CONVICTION IN THESE OTHER DOCUMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN FILED. 
AND IN THE EVENT THAT ISSUE GETS OPENED UP, I WOULD ALLOW THE 
STATE, IF THEY HAVE ADEQUATE BASIS TO BRING THAT IN, THEN, 
YOU KNOW, THEY COULD SHOW PROPER FOUNDATION FOR THAT, IT 
COULD COME IN. BUT THERE IS SOME STUFF THERE THAT CANNOT 
COME IN IF WE EVER GET INTO THAT — 
MR. MILES: THAT'S CORRECT, THE PROBATION VIOLATION 
PROCEEDINGS THAT ARE ATTACHED TO THIS ~ 
THE COURT: WELL, AND A LOT OF STUFF IN THERE WOULD 
NEVER BE ADMISSIBLE. 
MR. MILES: WELL, AND THAT WOULD BE ~ 
THE COURT: BUT THE CONFIRMATION BY A JUDGE ON RECORD, 
IF YOU CAN PROVE THAT'S WHAT THAT IS — 
MR. MILES: WHICH IS ALSO CERTIFIED BY A CLERK. 
THE COURT: — MIGHT BE ADMISSIBLE, BUT — SO, YOU KNOW, 
I DON'T KNOW WHERE YOU WANNA GO WITH IT. I'M JUST SAYING 
4/ 
1 THAT I AM OF THE OPINION THAT LEGALLY, THIS SATISFIES THE 
2 ENTRY BY THE CLERK IN THE MINUTES WITH A BRIEF STATEMENT OF 
3 THE OFFENSE FOR WHICH CONVICTION WAS HAD. AND IT HAS BEEN 
4 CERTIFIED AS THE OFFICIAL COURT RECORD WHICH I HAVE TO STATE 
5 IS DONE BY CLERKS. YOU KNOW, THAT'S THE ONLY WAY COURT 
6 RECORDS ARE NORMALLY MADE EXCEPT BY A CLERK OR A JUDGE. 
7 MP GRAVIS: SO YOU'RE TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE THAT THIS 
8 WAS PREPARED BY A CLERK. 
9 THE COURT: YES — WELL, NOT REALLY. I'M SAYING IT WAS 
10 ENTERED BY A CLERK OR IT WAS CERTIFIED BY A CLERK — 
11 MH GRAVIS: CLERK — 
12 THE COURT: — AS THE OFFICIAL — 
13 MR. GRAVIS: BUT YOU'RE — BUT YOU'RE NOT MAKING ANY 
14 SPECIFIC FINDING THAT IT WAS ACTUALLY PREPARED ~ 
15 THE COURT: I DON'T KNOW EXACTLY WHICH CLERK MIGHT HAVE 
16 PUT IT IN. IT'S ONLY CERTIFIED THAT IT WAS DONE IN THE 
17 OFFICIAL RECORD. AND I'M ASSUMING IT WAS DONE BY A CLERK OR 
18 A JUDGE. 
19 MR. GRAVIS: OKAY. YOU'RE ASSUMING IT WAS DONE. 
20 THE COURT: I AM, UH-HUH, BECAUSE SHE CERTIFIED THAT. 
21 MR. GRAVIS: OKAY. WE'D ASK THE STATE TO PREPARE 
22 FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
23 THE COURT: OKAY. NOW, THIS CASE IS SET FOR TRIAL ON 
24 WHAT DATES? 
25 MR GRAVIS: NOT SET. 
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MR. MILES: THIS PARTICULAR CASE HAS NOT BEEN SET FOR 
TRIAL AT THIS POINT, YOUR HONOR. THE CASE — WE ARE 
CONFIRMED FOR TRIAL ON THE 17TH AND 18TH — 
THE COURT: THE ONE WITH MR. HUTCHISON? 
MR. MILES: THAT'S CORRECT. 
THE COURT: DO YOU WANNA GET A DATE NOW? 
MR. GRAVIS: YEAH. 
THE CLERK: HOW MANY DAYS? 
MR. MILES: ONE TO MAYBE TWO, TOPS. 
THE COURT: HOW LONG DO YOU THINK, MR. GRAVIS? 
MR. GRAVIS: PROBABLY TWO DAYS. 
THE COURT: TWO DAYS. 
THE CLERK: I CAN SET THE 19TH AND 20TH OF DECEMBER. OR 
THE 20TH AND 21ST. 
THE COURT: 19TH AND 20TH OR 20TH AND 21ST. 
MR. GRAVIS: 20TH AND 21ST. 
MR. MILES: 20TH — 
THE COURT: 20TH AND 21ST OF DECEMBER. 
MR. MILES: FINE WITH THE STATE. 
THE COURT: 
THE CLERK: 
THE COURT: 
THE CLERK: 
MR. MILES: 
YOUR HONOR? 
THAT'S A FIRST SET? 
FOR THE 20TH AND THE 21ST? 
YES. 
YES. 
FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE TO BE HELD WHEN, 
'it 
MR. GRAVIS: DECEMBER 4TH? 
THE COURT: DECEMBER 4TH — 
MR. MILES: THAT'S FINE FOR THE STATE. 
THE COURT: — FOR THE FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE. 
MR. GRAVIS: AND WHEN WILL YOU HAVE FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW? 
MR. MILES: I'LL TRY TO DO IT PROBABLY AFTER HIS TRIAL 
WITH MR. HUTCHISON. 
MR. GRAVIS: OKAY. JUST AS LONG AS I HAVE THEM BEFORE 
THE 4TH OF DECEMBER. 
MR. MILES: OH, YEAH, WELL BEFORE. 
MR. GRAVIS: OKAY. THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. 
MR. GRAVIS: GO BACK TO NUMBER 11 ~ 
THE COURT: NOW, BEFORE WE LEAVE MR. HERNANDEZ, SO 
YOU'RE ALL AWARE, I HAVE THIS ORDER THAT I'VE SIGNED FOR 
MR. HUTCHISON AWARDING THE THOUSAND DOLLARS TO DO THE WORK 
(UNINTELLIGIBLE). 
MR. MILES: THAT'S FINE. 
MR. HERNANDEZ: I APPRECIATE THAT. 
THE COURT: I'VE SIGNED THAT SO IT'S ENTERED NOW INTO 
THE FILE. 
MR. MILES: I'LL LET THE CIVIL DEPARTMENT HANDLE THAT. 
THAT WAS THEIR ISSUE. 
THE COURT: WELL, JUST TELL THEM. 
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DATE: June 23,2005 
TO: LOS ANGELES COURT, ATTN: CERTIFICATION CLERK 
FROM: WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, OGDEN UTAH 
OUR OFFICE IS IN NEED OF A CERTIFIED COPY OF PREVIOUS 
CONVICTIONS) ON THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUAL IN ORDER TO FTLE AN 
ENHANCED INFORMATION. THE COURT REQUIRES A CERTIFIED COPY OF 
THE CONVICTION/SENTENCE if available... 
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04/18/1975 
(tt CASE NO.: 
(2) OFFENSE: 
KA 038275-01 
POSSESS CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
PLEASE PROVIDE A CERTIFIED COPY OF THE JUDGEMENT AND 
CONVICTION, SIGNED AND BY A JUDGE AND COURT CLERIC (UNDER 
SEAL), BY MAIL. TO THIS OFFICE, ATTENTION ANGIE. IF YOU HAVE ANY 
QUESTIONS PLEASE CALL ME AT 801-399-8674. 
Thank you, 
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Printed on recycled paper 
I HE 0QGUMENT TO WHICH THB CERTIFICATE K 
ATTACHED IS A FULL TRUE, AND CORRECT CQP> 
OF THE ORIGINAL ON F I E AND OF RECORD IN 
MY OFFICE. 
ATTEST 
Executive Officer / Clark of t i e 
Superior Court of CaBfomJa, County of' 
Los Angeles 
IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF EAST DISTRICT JUDICIAL DISTRICT, 
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
A038275 PAGE NO. 1 
EOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA VS. CURRENT DATE 06/23/05 
DANT 01: ANGEL JESUS HERNANDEZ 
NFORCEMENT AGENCY EFFECTING ARREST: LASD - WALNUT/SAN DIMAS STATIN 
APPEARANCE AMOUNT DATE RECEIPT OR SURETY COMPANY REGISTER 
DATE OF BAIL POSTED BOND NO. NUMBER 
FILED ON 11/21/97. 
MATION FILED ON 12/05/97. 
SE(S): 
UNT 01: 11379.6(A) H&S FEL - MANUFACTURE CONTROLED SUBSTNCE. 
UNT 02: 11377(A) H&S FEL - POSSESS CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
TTED ON OR ABOUT 11/04/97 IN THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES 
SCHEDULED EVENT: 
05/97 830 AM ARRAIGNMENT DIST EAST DISTRICT DEPT EAE 
/02/97 AT 600 PM : 
LIM TRANSCRIPT FILED SJ 
/OS/97 AT 830 AM IN EAST DISTRICT DEPT EAE 
E CALLED FOR ARRAIGNMENT 
ES: DANIEL LOPEZ (JUDGE) SHIRLEY JETT (CLERK) 
JOYCE MALLETT (REP) MARGARET MOE (DA) 
C DEFENDER APPOINTED. JEFFREY ZIMEL - P.D. 
DANT IS PRESENT IN COURT, AND REPRESENTED BY JEFFREY ZIMEL DEPUTY PUBLIC 
ENDER 
FORMATION FILED AND THE DEFENDANT IS ARRAIGNED. 
DANT WAIVES FURTHER ARRAIGNMENT. 
DANT PLEADS NOT GUILTY TO COUNT 01, 11379.6(A) H&S - MANUFACTURE CONTROLED 
BSTNCE. 
DANT PLEADS NOT GUILTY TO COUNT 02, 11377(A) H&S - POSSESS CONTROLLED 
STANCE. 
RT ORDERS AND FINDINGS: 
E COURT, WITH THE CONSENT OF THE DEFENDANT AND ALL COUNSEL, 
EFERS THE MATTER TO THE PROBATION DEPARTMENT FOR A PRE-PLEA 
EPORT PURSUANT TO CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 131.3. 
E COURT ORDERS THE DEFENDANT TO APPEAR ON THE NEXT COURT DATE. 
ENDANT DENIES ALLEGATIONS. 
SCHEDULED EVENT: 
MOTION OF COURT 
/98 830 AM PRETRIAL CONFERENCE DIST EAST DISTRICT DEPT EAE 
SCHEDULED EVENT 2: 
MOTION OF COURT 
02/98 830 AM JURY TRIAL DIST EAST DISTRICT DEPT EAE 
DY STATUS: DEFENDANT REMANDED 
/06/98 AT 830 AM IN EAST DISTRICT DEPT EAE 
E CALLED FOR PRETRIAL CONFERENCE 
ES: DANIEL LOPEZ (JUDGE) SHIRLEY JETT (CLERK) 
JOYCE MALLETT (REP) MARGARET MOE (DA) 
E NO. KA038275 
NO. 01 
PAGE NO. 2 
DATE PRINTED 06/23/05 
_NDANT IS PRESENT IN COURT, AND REPRESENTED BY JEFFREY ZIMEL DEPUTY PUBLIC 
EFENDER 
ENDANT ADVISED OF AND PERSONALLY AND EXPLICITLY WAIVES THE FOLLOWING RIGHTS: 
WRITTEN ADVISEMENT OF RIGHTS AND WAIVERS FILED, INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE 
EIN 
*L BY COURT AND TRIAL BY JURY 
CONFRONTATION AND CROSS-EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES; 
SUBPOENA OF WITNESSES INTO COURT TO TESTIFY IN YOUR DEFENSE; 
\GAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION; 
ENDANT ADVISED OF THE FOLLOWING: 
E NATURE OF THE CHARGES AGAINST HIM, THE ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE IN THE 
JRMATION AND POSSIBLE DEFENSES TO SUCH CHARGES; 
E POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF A PLEA OF GUILTY OR NOLO CONTENDERE, INCLUDING 
rHE MAXIMUM PENALTY AND ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS AND THE POSSIBLE LEGAL 
EFFECTS AND MAXIMUM PENALTIES INCIDENT TO SUBSEQUENT CONVICTIONS FOR THE 
SAME OR SIMILAR OFFENSES; 
E EFFECTS OF PROBATION; 
YOU ARE NOT A CITIZEN, YOU ARE HEREBY ADVISED THAT A CONVICTION OF THE 
JFFENSE FOR WHICH YOU HAVE BEEN CHARGED WILL HAVE THE CONSEQUENCES OF 
JEPORTATTON, EXCLUSION FROM ADMISSION TO THE UNITED STATES, OR DENIAL OF 
NATURALIZATION PURSUANT TO THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES; 
COURT FINDS THAT EACH SUCH WAIVER IS KNOWINGLY, UNDERSTANDINGLY, AND 
<PLICITLY MADE; COUNSEL JOINS IN THE WAIVERS 
i MOTION OF DEFENDANT, PLEA TO COUNT 01 VACATED AND SET ASIDE, AND NEW AND 
EFFERENT PLEA OF GUILTY ENTERED. 
NT (01) : DISPOSITION: CONVICTED 
IT FINDS THAT THERE IS A FACTUAL BASIS FOR DEFENDANT'S PLEA, AND COURT 
XEPTS PLEA. 
HAL DATE OF 2-2-98 ADVANCED AND VACATED. 
'JRT CONSIDERS THE PRE-PLEA REPORT. 
£S TIME FOR SENTENCE. 
T SCHEDULED EVENT: 
ENTENCING 
TO COUNT (01): 
ERVE 5 YEARS IN ANY STATE PRISON 
)URT SELECTS THE MID TERM OF 5 YEARS AS TO COUNT 01. 
:UTION OF SENTENCE SUSPENDED 
ENDANT PLACED ON FORMAL PROBATION 
)R A PERIOD OF 003 YEARS UNDER THE FOLLOWING TERMS AND CONDITIONS: 
ERVE 365 DAYS IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY JAIL 
DEFENDANT GIVEN TOTAL CREDIT FOR 96 DAYS IN CUSTODY 64 DAYS ACTUAL CUSTODY 
AND 32 DAYS GOOD TIME/WORK TIME 
N ADDITION: 
THE DEFENDANT IS TO PAY A RESTITUTION FINE PURSUANT TO SECTION 
1202.4(B) PENAL CODE IN THE AMOUNT OF $200.00 
[NCREMENT (11372.5 H&S, LAB ANALYSIS) $ 50.00 
NOT USE OR POSSESS ANY NARCOTICS, DANGEROUS OR RESTRICTED DRUGS 
OR ASSOCIATED PARAPHERNALIA, EXCEPT WITH VALID PRESCRIPTION, AND 
STAY AWAY FROM PLACES WHERE USERS, BUYERS OR SELLERS CONGREGATE, 
EXCEPT IN AN AUTHORIZED DRUG COUNSELING PROGRAM. 
NOT ASSOCIATE WITH PERSONS KNOWN BY YOU TO BE NARCOTIC OR DRUG 
USERS OR SELLERS. 
sUBMIT TO PERIODIC ANTI-NARCOTIC TESTS AS DIRECTED BY THE' 
PROBATION OFFICER. 
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IT ASSOCIATE WITH CO-DEFENDANT(S) TYSON 3 DANGLEIS 
OPERATE WITH THE PROBATION OFFICER IN A PLAN FOR DRUG 
COUNSELING AND REHABILITATION 
IPPORT DEPENDENTS AS DIRECTED BY THE PROBATION OFFICER. 
EK AND MAINTAIN TRAINING, SCHOOLING OR EMPLOYMENT AS APPROVED 
Y THE PROBATION OFFICER. 
INTAIN RESIDENCE AS APPROVED BY THE PROBATION OFFICER. 
T OWN, USE OR POSSESS ANY DANGEROUS OR DEADLY WEAPONS, 
NCLUDING ANY FIREARMS, KNIVES OR OTHER CONCEALABLE WEAPONS. 
BMIT PERSON AND PROPERTY TO SEARCH OR SEIZURE AT ANY TIME OF 
HE DAY OR NIGHT BY ANY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER OR BY PROBATION 
FFICER WITH OR WITHOUT A WARRANT. 
EY ALL LAWS AND ORDERS OF THE COURT. 
EY ALL RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE PROBATION DEPARTMENT. 
E ONLY TRUE NAME WITH GOVERNMENT AND POLICE OFFICIALS, WHICH 
S ANGEL JESUS HERNANDEZ 
RT ORDERS AND FINDINGS: 
FENDANT TO REPORT TO THE PROBATION OFFICER WITHIN 48 HOURS 
FTER RELEASE FROM CUSTODY. 
Y THE COSTS OF PROBATION SERVICES (PURSUANT TO 1203.IB PC) TO 
HE PROBATION OFFICER IN THE AMOUNT THE PROBATION OFFICER SHALL 
RESCRIBE. 
FENDANT ORDERED TO REPORT TO FINANCIAL EVALUATOR WITHIN 5 
DAYS OF RELEASE FROM CUSTODY 
GISTER AS NARCOTIC OFFENDER WITH LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENT OR 
HERIFF'S DEPARTMENT. 
FENDANT ACKNOWLEDGES TO THE COURT THAT THE DEFENDANT 
NDERSTANDS AND ACCEPTS ALL THE PROBATION CONDITIONS, AND 
EFENDANT AGREES TO ABIDE BY SAME. 
(01): DISPOSITION: CONVICTED 
NING COUNTS DISMISSED: 
UNT (02): DISMISSED DUE TO PLEA NEGOTIATION 
ACT ISSUED ON 01/06/98 FOR COUNT 01 
UDGMENT CODE JG 
SCHEDULED EVENT: 
BATION IN EFFECT/REMANDED 
OY STATUS: DEFENDANT REMANDED 
/10/98 AT 830 AM : 
SUANT TO REQUEST FROM PROBATION DEPARTMENT, MATTER IS SET ON 
ENDAR FOR 010499 AT 8:30AM IN DEPARTMENT EAE. HEARING ON 
iLATION. 
SCHEDULED EVENT: 
04/99 830 AM POSSIBLE VIOL. OF PROBATION DIST EAST DISTRICT DEPT EAE 
./04/99 AT 830 AM IN EAST DISTRICT DEPT EAE 
E CALLED FOR POSSIBLE VIOL. OF PROBATION 
ES: THEODORE D. PIATT (JUDGE) BLANCA AZPEITIA (CLERK) 
SHARON FOX (REP) CONSTANCE E. BUGH (DA) 
IDANT IS PRESENT IN COURT, AND REPRESENTED BY M.R. COGHLAN DEPUTY PUBLIC 
ENDER 
IBATION REVOKED 
I COUNT (01): 
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cFENDANT NOT IN COURT. PROBATION REVOKED. BENCH WARRANT IS 
SSUED. NO BAIL. LATER: DEFENDANT APPEARS IN COURT. DEFEN-
ANT REMANDED. NO BAIL. BENCH WARRANT PREVIOUSLY ISSUED IS 
UASHED AND RECALLED. 
ATTER SET FOR VIOLATION HEARING. PEOPLE WILL SUBPENA PROBATION 
FFICER INTO COURT FOR 1-21-99. 
L SET AT NO BAIL. 
ABSTRACT NOT REQUIRED 
F SCHEDULED EVENT: 
1/21/99 830 AM PROBATION VIOLATION HEARING DIST EAST DISTRICT DEPT EAE 
TODY STATUS: REMANDED TO CUSTODY 
)l/21/99 AT 830 AM IN EAST DISTRICT DEPT EAE 
\SE CALLED FOR PROBATION VIOLATION HEARING 
TIES: DAVID S. MILTON (JUDGE) BLANCA AZPEITIA (CLERK) 
SHARON FOX (REP) CONSTANCE E. BUGH (DA) 
ENDANT IS PRESENT IN COURT, AND REPRESENTED BY M.R. COGHLAN DEPUTY PUBLIC 
'.FENDER 
OTER RESET FOR VIOLATION HEARING TO 2-18-99. 
iOPLE TO RESUBPENA PROBATION OFFICER INTO COURT FOR 2-18-99. 
r SCHEDULED EVENT: 
>/18/99 830 AM PROBATION VIOLATION HEARING DIST EAST DISTRICT DEPT EAE 
TODY STATUS: DEFENDANT REMANDED 
)2/18/99 AT 830 AM IN EAST DISTRICT DEPT EAE 
VSE CALLED FOR PROBATION VIOLATION HEARING 
•IES: DAVID S. MILTON (JUDGE) BLANCA AZPEITIA (CLERK) 
SHARON FOX (REP) ABRAM WEISBROT (DDA) 
DEFENDANT IS PRESENT(IN LOCK UP) AND REPRESENTED BY M.R. COGHLAN DEPUTY 
JBLIC DEFENDER 
LINK STANDS IN FOR M. COGHLAN. MATTER CONTINUED AS INDICATED 
•OPLE TO HAVE WITNESSES HERE ON 3-4-99. 
• SCHEDULED EVENT: 
)N MOTION OF COURT 
1/04/99 830 AM PROBATION VIOLATION HEARING DIST EAST DISTRICT DEPT EAE 
•ODY STATUS: DEFENDANT REMANDED 
>3/04/99 AT 830 AM IN EAST DISTRICT DEPT EAE 
iSE CALLED FOR PROBATION VIOLATION HEARING 
IES: DAVID S. MILTON (JUDGE) BLANCA AZPEITIA (CLERK) 
SHARON FOX (REP) RICHARD CEBALLOS (DA) 
LNDANT IS PRESENT IN COURT, AND REPRESENTED BY M.R. COGHLAN DEPUTY PUBLIC 
•FENDER 
tT FINDS DEFENDANT IN VIOLATION OF PROBATION. 
tOBATION REVOKED 
SATION REINSTATED. 
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BATION IS CONTINUED ON SAME TERMS AND CONDITIONS. 
COUNT (01): 
BATION OFFICER DARILYN FARRIS AND DEFENDANT ARE SWORN AND ARE 
TIFY. DEFENDANT IS ORDERED TO SERVE 365 DAYS IN COUNTY JAIL. 
ENDANT RECEIVES 0 CREDITS. 
RT ORDERS NO EARLY RELEASE FROM COUNTY JAIL. 
BSTRACT NOT REQUIRED 
SCHEDULED EVENT: 
BATION IN EFFECT/REMANDED 
DY STATUS: ON PROBATION. 
iHE DOCUMENT TO WHCH THIS CERTIFICATE C> 
ATTACHED £ A FULL, TRUE, AND CORRECT C O N 
OF THE ORIGINAL ON F I E AND OF RECORD N 
MY OFFICE. 
ATTEST 
.Deputy 
